Abstract. There only exists one deterministic identity-based encryption (DIBE) scheme which is adaptively secure in the auxiliary-input setting, under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. However, the master public key consists of O(λ) basic matrices. In this paper, we consider to construct adaptively secure DIBE schemes with more compact public parameters from the LWE problem.
Introduction
A DIBE scheme is an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [17] whose encryption algorithm is deterministic. This primitive was proposed by Bellare et al. [5] via extending the security definition under high min-entropy into the identitybased setting. In order to construct DIBE schemes, Bellare et al. [5] first defined a notion of identity-based lossy trapdoor functions (IB-LTDFs). And they obtained a DIBE scheme by constructing an IB-LTDF with a universal property, based on the DLIN assumption. However, due to the inherent limitation of IBLTDFs, their scheme can only achieve a selective security, i.e., the adversary must commit an challenge identity before getting the master public key from the challenger.
In SCN12, Xie et al. [18] gave a more efficient secure DIBE scheme in the auxiliary-input setting, based on the hardness of the LWE problem. In their scheme, there exists only 3 matrices in the master public key. However, the scheme only satisfies a selective security as same as the scheme in [5] . The more significant contribution of Xie et al. [18] is that they proposed the first DIBE scheme with a much more realistic adaptive security (or equivalently, full security) in the auxiliary-input setting, based on the same assumption. To our best knowledge, their scheme is the only DIBE scheme that achieves an adaptive security. However, their scheme requires + 2 basic matrices in the master public key so that it is less efficient than their selectively secure scheme, where is the bit length of the identity and = Θ(λ). 
|mpk| shows the size of the master public key. Q and denote the number of key extraction queries and the advantage of the adversary, respectively. poly(n) represents a fixed but large polynomial that does not depend Q and . To measure the reduction cost, we show the advantage of the LWE algorithm constructed from the adversary against the corresponding DIBE scheme. †, ϕ > 1 is the constant satisfying s = 1 − 2 − 1 ϕ , where s ∈ {0, 1} is the relative distance of the underlying error correcting code. We can take ϕ as close to 1 as one wants. §, c = c1 + c2 and c1, c2 are the smallest integers satisfying that LPHFs with high min-entropy can be constructed from partitioning functions with compatible algorithms [20] . And we show that the IBE schemes in [19, 14, 4] naturally imply instantiations of LPHFs with high min-entropy.
Combining with the result of Zhang et al., we conclude that the adaptively secure and anonymous IBE schemes in [1, 15, 22, 4, 19, 14, 20] naturally imply instantiations of LPHFs with high min-entropy 1 .
• When instantiating our generic DIBE construction with four LPHFs with high min-entropy in [20, 19, 22] , we can get four adaptively secure DIBE schemes with more compact public parameters. In our DIBE schemes, the master public key respectively consists of ω(log 2 λ), ω(log λ), √ λ, O(log Q) number of basic matrices, where Q denotes the number of key extraction queries. Please see more details in Figure 1 .
Related Works. In [5] , Bellare et al. extended the notion of lossy trapdoor function (LDTF) to identity-setting and introduced the notion of identity-based LTDF (IB-LTDF). And they used IB-LTDF to construct DIBE scheme with a selective security from pairings. Soon afterwards, Escala et al. [10] extended the notion of IB-LTDF [5] and introduced the notion of hierarchical identity-based trapdoor functions (HIB-TDFs). With HIB-TDFs, they could construct deterministic hierarchical identity-based schemes (DHIBE). They instantiated HIBTDFs from pairings so that they constructed a pairing-based DHIBE scheme. Fang et al. [11] constructed a DHIBE scheme with a selective security based on the hardness of the learning with rounding problem over small modulus [6] . In fact, a DHIBE with a selective security implies a selectively secure DIBE. In SC-N12, Xie et al. [18] gave a more efficient DIBE scheme with a security security. Additionally, they also proposed the first and the only DIBE scheme with an adaptive security in the auxiliary-input setting.
Remarks. This work is very relevant to [21] in which we constructed the DIBE schemes DIBE MAH , DIBE AFF and DIBE Yam16 directly from the works of Yamada [19, 20] . As our growing understanding, we find that all adaptively secure DIBE schemes in [18, 21] can be explained by using LPHFs with high min-entropy 2 . So, in this paper, we present a generic DIBE construction from LPHFs with high min-entropy.
Preliminaries
Notations. Let λ be the security parameter, and all other quantities are implicitly dependent on λ. Let negl(λ) denote a negligible function and poly(λ) denote an unspecified function f (λ) = O(λ c ) for some constant c. A function f is -hard-to-invert with respect to the distribution D, if given h(x) with x $ ← D, 1 Note that Boyen and Li [7] constructed an adaptively secure and anonymous IBE scheme with tight security. However, their construction does not imply a LPHF and is not in our framework. 2 Note that the adaptively secure DIBE scheme in [18] is constructed from the LPHF with high min-entropy in [1, 15] .
there exists no PPT algorithm can find x with probability better than . For n ∈ N, we use [n] to denote a set {1, · · · , n}. And for integer q ≥ 2, Z q denotes the quotient ring of integer modulo q. We use bold capital letters to denote matrices, such as A, B, and bold lowercase letters to denote column vectors, such as x, y. The notations A and [A|B] denote the transpose of the matrix A and the matrix of concatenating A and B, respectively. For n ∈ N, we use [n] to denote a set {1, · · · , n}. For integer q ≥ 2, Z q denotes the quotient ring of integer modulo q. For integers q ≥ p ≥ 2 and
Deterministic Identity-Based Encryption and Its Security
A deterministic identity-based encryption scheme DIBE with the identity space ID can be defined by a tuple of PPT algorithms DIBE.Setup, DIBE.KGen, DIBE.Enc, DIBE.Dec. The DIBE.Setup algorithm takes a security parameter 1 λ as input and outputs a master secret key mpk and a master secret key msk ∈ M. The DIBE.KGen algorithm takes mpk, msk, id ∈ ID as input and outputs a private key sk id . The deterministic algorithm DIBE.Enc takes mpk, id ∈ ID and a message msg, outputs a ciphertext c. The deterministic algorithm DIBE.Dec decrypts ciphertexts using the private key sk id . We require that for all λ, all id ∈ ID, and all msg ∈ M, Pr [DIBE.Dec(mpk, sk id , id, DIBE.Enc(mpk, id, msg)) = msg] = 1 − negl(λ).
Definition 1 ([18]
). We say that a DIBE scheme DIBE is PRIV1-ID-INDrsecure with respect to -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs if for any PPT algorithm A, for any efficiently sampled distribution M, and any efficiently computable H hard = {h} that is -hard-to-invert with respect to M, such that the advantage of A in the following game is negligible. Setup. At the outset of the game, the challenger runs DIBE.Setup(1 λ ) which outputs a pair (mpk, msk) and gives mpk to A. Phase 1. When A adaptively makes key-extraction queries to the challenger, the challenger returns sk id ← DIBE.KGen(mpk, msk, id), for all id in the keyextraction queries. Challenge Phase. At some point, A outputs an identity id * , on which it wishes to be challenged. Then, the challenger picks a random coin coin 
LPHFs with High Min-Entropy [22]
Let , m, m, n, q, v be some polynomials in the security parameter λ. By I n we denote the set of invertible matrices in Z n×n q . A hash function H : ID → Z n×m q consists of two algorithms (H.Gen, H.Eval). Given the security parameter λ, the probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) key generation algorithm H.Gen(1 λ ) outputs a key K, i.e., K ← H.Gen(1 λ ). For any input id ∈ ID = {0, 1} , the efficiently deterministic evaluation algorithm H.Eval(K, id) outputs a hash value Z ∈ Z n×m q , i.e., Z = H.Eval(K, id). the following properties hold: Syntax : The PPT algorithm (K , td) ← H.TrapGen(1 λ , A, B) outputs a key K together with a trapdoor td. Moreover, for any input id ∈ ID, the deterministic algorithm (R id , S id ) = H.TrapEval(td, K , id) returns R id ∈ Z m×m q and S id ∈ Z n×n q such that s 1 (R id ) ≤ β and S id ∈ I n ∪{0} hold with overwhelming probability over the trapdoor td that is produced along with K . Correctness : For all possible (K , td) ← H.TrapGen(1 λ , A, B), all id ∈ ID and its corresponding (R id , S id ) = H.TrapEval(td, K , id), we have
Statistically close trapdoor keys : For all (K , td) ← H.TrapGen(1 λ , A, B), and
, we have that
Definition 3 (LPHFs with High Min-Entropy). Let H : ID → Z n×m q be a (1, v, β, γ, δ)-LPHF with γ = negl(λ) and noticeable δ > 0. Let K be the key space of H, and let H.TrapGen and H.TrapEval be a pair of trapdoor generation and trapdoor evaluation algorithms for H. We say that H is a LPHF with high min-entropy if for uniformly random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a (public) trapdoor matrix B ∈ Z n×m q , the following condition holds
Remark 1. Note that this definition of LPHFs with min high-entropy is much weaker that Zhang et al's definition of LPHFs with min high-entropy which includes another one requirement. In [14] , Katsumata and Yamada found that this requirement is not necessary, i.e., we can define this weaker version of LPHFs with min high-entropy while keeping their functionality-constructing IBE schemes.
Generic DIBE Construction
Here, we construct an adaptively secure DIBE scheme in the auxiliary-input setting by using a (1, v, β, γ, δ) LPHF H with high min-entropy from {0, 1} to Z n×m q , where γ is negligible and δ > 0 is noticeable. Let H.TrapGen and H.TrapEval be a pair of trapdoor generation and trapdoor evaluation algorithm of H that satisfies the condition in Definition 3, where integers n, m, q, v, β are polynomials in the security parameter λ. Additionally, let integers m = O(n log q), m = m + m. We assume ID = {0, 1} and M = Z n t , where ID is the user identity space and M is the message space. Our generic DIBE scheme DIBE = (DIBE.Setup, DIBE.KGen, DIBE.Enc, DIBE.Dec) is defined as follows.
• Setup. Algorithm DIBE.Setup takes 1 λ as input, and generates a pair (A, T A )
• Key Generation. Algorithm DIBE.KGen takes mpk and id ∈ ID as inputs. It first computes
• Encryption. Algorithm DIBE.Enc takes mpk, id ∈ ID, m ∈ M as inputs.
It first computers
. Then, it outputs the ciphertext c = F id m p .
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext c with a private key sk id = T F id , the algorithm DIBE.Dec computers m $ ← Invert(c, F id , sk id ). Then, if m ∈ Z n t it outputs m, and otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Correctness and Parameter Selection
In order to make sure the correctness of the DIBE scheme and make the security proof follow through, we need the following to satisfy.
• TrapGen in Lemma 4 (Item 1) can work (m ≥ 6n log q ), and it returns T A satisfying
• In order to keep the correctness of the DIBE scheme, i.e., Invert in Lemma 4 (Item 4) can work (
given by both SampleBasisLeft and SampleBasisRight.
• ReRand (Lemma 5) in the security proof can operate (θ > ω( √ log m), and
• Lemma 3 holds (q is super-polynomial and α/θ = negl(λ)).
•
To satisfy the above requirements, we set the parameters in Figure 2 . The private key size, ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor in our scheme are O(n 2+3η ), O(n 1+η log(mβ)) and O(n η log(mβ)/ log t) respectively. To optimize the ciphertext expansion factor, we can choose t = mβ, which makes the ciphertext expansion factor to be O(n η ). 
2 ) t message space mβ q modulus the prime nearest to 2
, where γ is negligible, δ > 0 is noticeable and independent of the modulus q, and large enough v = poly(n). Then, the above DIBE scheme DIBE is PRIV1-ID-INDr-secure with respect to 2 −k log t -hard-toinvert auxiliary inputs, assuming DLWE q,n,m,θ,H hard is hard.
According to Lemma 3, it is easy for us to get the following corollary.
, where γ is negligible, δ > 0 is noticeable and independent of the modulus q, and large enough v = poly(n). Then, the above DIBE scheme DIBE is PRIV1-ID-INDr-secure with respect to 2 −k log t -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs, assuming DLWE q,z,m,α is hard, where z = k log(t)−ω(log(λ)) log(q)
.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let A be a PPT adversary that breaks the PRIV1-IDINDr-security with auxiliary inputs of the DIBE scheme. Moreover, let = (λ) and Q = Q(λ) ≤ v be its advantage and the upper bound of the number of DIBE.KGen(mpk, msk, ·) queries, respectively. And let
denotes the challenge ID along with the queried IDs. For any distribution M over Z n t , let H hard = {h} be a set of z −k log(t) -hard-to-invert functions with respect to M. In order to prove the security of this DIBE scheme, we define a sequence of games. In each game, the challenger selects a uniform bit coin $ ← {0, 1}, while the adversary A finally returns a guess bit coin to the challenger. The challenger sets coin = coin in the orginal game, these values might be different in the latter games. In the following, we define X i as the event that coin = coin. 
Game 1 : This game is identical to Game 0 except that the challenger changes the setup and challenge phase as below. where ( R id * , S id * ) = H.TrapEval( td, K, id * ) and ( R idj , S idj ) = H.TrapEval( td, K, id j ). Then, the challenger proceeds the following steps: Abort Check : For (K , td) generated in the setup phase, if τ (td, K , I * ) = 1, the challenger aborts the game and sets coin $ ← {0, 1} ignoring the output of A. Otherwise, the following equation holds:
Setup. It first generates a pair (A, T
Artificial Abort : Fix I * , let p be the probability p = Pr[τ ( td, K, I * ) = 0] over the random choice of ( td, K). The challenger samples O(
times the probability p by independently running ( K, td) ← H.TrapGen(A, G) and evaluating τ ( td, K, I * ) to compute an estimate p . Then if p ≥ δ, the challenger will abort with probability
So as not to interrupt the proof of Theorem 1, we intentionally skip the proof for the time being. 
Then, the challenger sets c * 0 = c p . Finally, the challenger returns (c * coin , h(m)) to the adversary A. Phase 2. The challenger responds as in Phase 1, when receiving the private key query with identity id = id * . It is easy to see that
Game 4 : In this game, the challenger changes the way that the challenge ciphertext is created when coin = 0. Challenge Phase. The challenger computes (R id * , S id * ) = H.TrapEval(td, K , id * ).
If S id * = 0, the challenger aborts the game and sets coin 
Then, the challenger computes c * 0 = c p . Finally, the challenger returns (c * coin , h(m)) to the adversary A. Before analyzing the difference between Game 3 and Game 4 , we first define a "bad event" as follows:
n. For i ∈ {5, 6, 7}, similar event Bad i can also be defined in Game i . If Bad 4 does not occur for some c 1 , then we have
It immediately follows that for any adversary
Game 5 : In this game, the challenger changes the way that the challenge ciphertext is created when coin = 0. Challenge Phase. The challenger computes (R id * , S id * ) = H.TrapEval(td, K , id * ).
Then, the challenger computes c * 0 = c p . Finally, the challenger returns (c * coin , h(m)) to the adversary A.
We construct an algorithm B against the problem DLWE q,n,m,θ,H hard as follows. Given the problem instance of LWE (A, b = v + e) ∈ Z 
Game 7 : In this game, the challenger changes the way that the challenge ciphertext is created when coin = 0. Challenge Phase. The challenger computes (R id * , S id * ) = H.TrapEval(td, K , id * ).
If S id * = 0, the challenger aborts the game and sets coin $ ← {0, 1}. Otherwise, when coin = 0, the challenger computes
instead of running the algorithm ReRand, where 
by assumption on q and θ . In the meantime, because c is statistically close to uniform distribution over Z 
Summing up equations (1)- (8), we can get
In order to prove Theorem 1, we should prove that equation (1) holds. We will use Lemma 28 in the full version of the work [1] , which is described as follows.
Lemma 1 ([1]). Let I
* be a (Q + 1)-ID tuple {id * , {id j } j∈[Q] } denoted the challenge ID along with the queried ID's, and η(I * ) define the probability that an abort does not happen in Game 2 . Let η max = max η(I * ) and η min = min η(I * ).
For i = 1, 2, we set X i be the event that coin = coin at the end of Game i . Then, 
,
Finally, we have Pr[
Constructions of LPHFs with High Min-Entropy
In [22] , Zhang et al. proved that the IBE schemes in [1, 15, 22] implies instantiations of LPHFs with high min-entropy. In fact, the IBE scheme in [4] also imply an instantiation of LPHF with high min-entropy.
In this section, we show that LPHFs with high min-entropy can be constructed from partitioning functions with compatible algorithms [20] . Moreover, we prove that the adaptively secure and anonymous IBE schemes in [19, 14] naturally imply instantiations of LPHFs with high min-entropy. In a word, the adaptively secure and anonymous IBE schemes in [1, 15, 22, 4, 19, 14, 20] naturally imply instantiations of LPHFs with high min-entropy.
From Partitioning Functions with Compatible Algorithms [20]
Let F PF : K PF × ID → {0, 1} be a partitioning function with associating δ PFcompatible algorithms (Encode, PubEval, TrapEval) (See Appendix A). We assume ID = {0, 1} . Now, we show how to construct a (1, v, β, γ, δ)-LPHF with high min-entropy from the partitioning function F PF : K PF × ID → {0, 1}.
A hash function H : ID → Z n×m q consists of two algorithms (H.Gen, H.Eval) which are defined as follows:
, and returns these u+1 matrices, i.e.,
: For id ∈ ID, it first gets B id by running the algorithm PubEval(id ∈ ID, {B i ∈ Z n×m q } i∈ [u] ). Then, it returns Z = B 0 + B id .
The associating algorithms H.TrapGen and H.TrapEval are defined as follows.
u by operating the algorithm Encode(K PF ). Finally, it randomly chooses matrices R 1 , · · · , R u , R 0 $ ← {−1, 1} m×m , and returns
) and S id = F PF (K PF , id)· I n , where I n denotes the identity matrix of n × n. In this case,
Now, we show that this construction satisfies the following properties:
• Statistically close trapdoor keys: According to the Leftover Hash Lemma, the statistical distance between the distributions {A,
As a result, the statistical distance between {A, K lphf } and {A, K lphf } is negligible, i.e., γ = negl(λ).
In a word, this construction is a (1, v, √ 2m · (1 + δ PF ), negl(λ), γ min (λ))-LPHF. Finally, we show that this LPHF possesses the property 1, i.e., with high minentropy.
• For any (K lphf , td) ← H.TrapGen(1 λ , A, G), any id ∈ ID and its corresponding (R id , S id ) = H.TrapEval(td, K lphf , id), the following distributions are statistically close: [19] and KY16 [14] In [19] , Yamada proposed an adaptively secure and anonymous IBE with asymptotically short parameters. In particular, the master public key consists of O( 1/2 ) basic matrices. In this part, we show that their construction implies a LPHF with high min-entropy. For simplicity, we denotes it by H Yam16 : ID → Z ∈ Z n×m q , where ID = {0, 1} . In their construction, there exists an efficiently computable injective map S that maps an element id ∈ ID to a subset S(id) of [1, t] 2 , where t = √ . The algorithms (H Yam16 .Gen, H Yam16 .Eval) are defined as below.
From Yam16
: For all id ∈ ID, the algorithm H Yam16 .Eval is defined as follows,
The associating algorithms H Yam16 .TrapGen and H Yam16 .TrapEval are defined as 
In this case,
• Correctness: It is easy to verify that H.Eval(K , id) = AR id + S id G.
• Statistically close trapdoor keys: According to the Leftover Hash Lemma, the statistical distance between the distributions (A, B 0 ,
) is negligible.
• Well-distributed hidden matrices: For all (K , td) ← H.TrapGen(1 λ , A, G), any inputs id
where F y (id) = y 0 + (j1,j2)∈S(id) y 1,j1 · y 1,j2 .
In a word, this construction is a (1, v, m(1 + 4 n c ), negl(λ), 2 32( +1)Q 2 )-LPHF. Then, we show that H Yam16 is a LPHF which possess the properties 1, i.e., with high min-entropy.
• Property 1. For any (K , td) ← H Yam16 .TrapGen(1 λ , A, G), any id ∈ ID and its corresponding (R id , S id ) = H Yam16 .TrapEval(td, K , id), the following distributions are statistically close: Remark 2. The subsequent work by Katsumata and Yamada [14] showed that for the ring version of Yamada's scheme [19] , it is possible to reduce the magnitude of s 1 (R id ) (which inluences the selection of modulus q). We do not see any obstacle preventing us from constructing a programmable hash function with high min entropy from ideal lattices, according to the IBE scheme of [14] .
Instantiations of Generic DIBE construction
As mentioned in section 4, there are many LPHFs with high min-entropy in [1, 15, 22, 4, 20, 19, 14] . However, except the LPHF with high min-entropy [1] used by Xie et al. [18] to construct DIBE scheme, there only exist another four (1, v, β, γ, δ) LPHFs with high min-entropy which satisfy the requirement that δ is independent of the modulus q, under the LWE assumption. These four LPHFs with high min-entropy are briefly described in the following.
Zhang et al. [22] constructed one LPHF with high min-entropy, and using this LPHF with high min-entropy they presented an adaptively secure IBE scheme with more compact public parameters.
(1) H ZCZ16 in ZCZ16 [22] : a (1, v, µv m 1.5 · ω( √ log m), negl(λ), 1 N ) LPHF with high min-entropy, where N ≤ 16v 2 and µ = log N . Additionally, the key of H ZCZ16 only consists of µ = log N matrices.
In [20] , Yamada elaborately constructed two partitioning functions with compatible algorithms F MAH based on modified admissible hash function [13] and F AFF based on affine function. Using our generic construction in section 4.1, we can get two LPHFs with high min-entropy from both F MAH and F AFF , which are denoted by H MAH and H AFF respectively. , where s ∈ {0, 1} is the relative distance of the underlying error correcting code. We can take ϕ as close to 1 as one wants. In addition, the key of H MAH only consists of u = ω(log 2 λ) matrices. (3) H AFF : a (1, v, poly(λ), negl(λ), O( 2 Q )) LPHF with high min-entropy, where v is an arbitrary polynomial in λ. Furthermore, the key of H AFF only consists of ω(log λ) matrices.
As mentioned in section 4.2, the full secure IBE scheme in [19] implies an instantiation of LPHF with high min-entropy. Embedding these four LPHFs with high min-entropy into our generic DIBE construction, we can obtain four PRIV1-ID-INDr-secure DIBE schemes ( Figure  3 ) in the auxiliary-input setting, under the lWE assumption. 
|mpk|, |ct| show the size of the master public keys and ciphertexts, respectively. Q and denote the number of key extraction queries and the advantage, respectively. poly(n) represents a fixed but large polynomial that does not depend Q and . To measure the reduction cost, we show the advantage of the LWE algorithm constructed from the adversary against the corresponding DIBE scheme. † ϕ > 1 is the constant satisfying s = 1 − 2 − 1 ϕ , where s ∈ {0, 1} is the relative distance of the underlying error correcting code. We can take ϕ as close to 1 as one wants. ‡ c is the smallest integer satisfying that n c ≥ Q + 1. § c = c1 + c2 and c1, c2 are the smallest integers satisfying that .
For simplicity, we use DLWE q,n,m,β,H hard to denote the problem of distinguishing the above two distributions: A, A s + e, h(s) and (A, u, h(s)). According to Lemma 3, assuming the DLWE q,z,m,α , then the DLWE q,n,m,β,H hard problem is also intractable, where z = k log(t)−ω(log(λ)) log(q)
. In the following, we describe some useful facts that will be used in our generic DIBE construction. Gadget Matrix. As mentioned by [15] , for m > n log q , there exists a fullrank matrix G ∈ Z In [14] , Katsuamta and Yamada introduced the "Noise Rerandomization" lemma which plays an important role in the security proof because of creating a well distributed challenge ciphertext.
Lemma 5 (Noise Rerandomization [14] ). Let q, w, m be positive integers and r a positive real number with r > max{ω( √ log m), ω( √ log w)}. For arbitrary column vector b ∈ Z m q , vector e chosen from D Z m ,r , any matrix V ∈ Z w×m and positive real number σ > s 1 (V), there exists a PPT algorithm ReRand(V, b + e, r, σ) that outputs b = Vb + e ∈ Z w where e is distributed statistically close to D Z w ,2rσ .
